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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________                        
 
No. 11-3794 
_____________ 
                         
NAOMI C. SATTERWHITE, 
Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY; 
MONTGOMERY COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS                          
_____________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-09-cv-01024) 
District Judge: Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
_____________                         
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 19, 2012 
 
Before:  SLOVITER, RENDELL and HARDIMAN, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion Filed:  September 20, 2012)                         
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT                         
_____________ 
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge
Naomi Satterwhite sued her employer, Montgomery County, alleging racial 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.  The District Court granted Montgomery County’s 
. 
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motion for summary judgment because Satterwhite failed to present evidence that she 
was qualified for the positions that she sought.  We will affirm the District Court’s 
judgment. 
BACKGROUND 
Satterwhite is an African American who worked for 25 years as a full-time judicial 
secretary at the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas until her retirement in 
2000.  In November 2005, she decided to come out of retirement and began working for 
Montgomery County as a Tipstaff.  In November 2006, she discussed with her supervisor 
a potential switch from her position as a Tipstaff to a full-time substitute judicial 
secretary position or a part-time on-call secretary position.  At her interview, Satterwhite 
stated, “I’m not interested in a full-time position.”  (102a.)  In a letter sent to confirm the 
interview, Satterwhite expressed interest in the on-call position “provided [she was] given 
an approximate schedule for services needed rather than waiting for a call.”  (178a.)  She 
was not hired for either position.        
Satterwhite sued, claiming that the hiring decisions were based on racial animus 
and that the reasons proffered by Montgomery County were pretextual.  The District 
Court granted summary judgment for Montgomery County, holding that Satterwhite 
failed to establish a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  Satterwhite was not 
qualified for either position she sought, the District Court held, because she was unable to 
work on an as needed basis and unwilling to accept a full-time job.   
On appeal, Satterwhite argues that the District Court found only one element of 
the prima facie case for racial discrimination to be lacking, that its finding on this element 
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was error, that the finding did not take all the evidence into account, and that the reasons 
proffered by Montgomery County for not hiring her were pretextual. 
I.  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of the District Court’s summary 
judgment order is plenary.  Detz v. Greiner Indus., Inc., 346 F.3d 109, 115 (3d Cir. 2003).  
Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issue of material fact exists, and if the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Marino v. Indus. Crating Co., 358 F.3d 
241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 A Title VII race discrimination plaintiff must meet an initial prima facie burden 
consisting of four elements: (1) that she is a member of a protected class; (2) that she was 
qualified for the job; (3) that she did not receive the job despite those qualifications; and 
(4) after the plaintiff’s rejection, the job remained open and the employer sought 
applications from individuals with the plaintiff’s qualifications.  McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). 
 If the plaintiff meets this initial burden, then the burden of production shifts to the 
defendant to show a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff.  
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000).  If the defendant 
proffers a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for not hiring the plaintiff, then the 
burden of production again shifts to the plaintiff to establish that the reason offered by the 
defendant is pretextual.  Id. at 142-43. 
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II.  
 The District Court correctly held that Satterwhite was unqualified for the positions 
she sought.  A plaintiff must possess the minimal qualifications for a position to establish 
a prima facie case of racial discrimination.  Makky v. Chertoff, 541 F.3d 205, 215 (3d Cir. 
2008).  The District Court correctly noted that willingness to accept and perform the job 
is an objective minimal qualification of the position.  Satterwhite mentioned in her 
interview that she was “not interested in a full-time job.”  (102a.)  This rendered her 
objectively unqualified for the substitute judicial secretary job, which was a full-time 
position.   
 Likewise, Satterwhite did not meet the objective minimal qualifications of the 
part-time on-call secretary position.  While Satterwhite expressed interest in the part-time 
position, she indicated that she required “an approximate schedule for services needed 
rather than waiting for a call.”  (178a.)  Again, the District Court correctly noted that the 
official job description for the part-time on-call position specifies that the employee must 
be available “on an as needed basis.”  (181a.)  Satterwhite’s need for a set schedule was 
incongruent with the requirements for the part-time on-call position.1
 Satterwhite argues that Montgomery County had prior knowledge of these facts, 
and its subsequent decision to interview her in spite of that knowledge is evidence that 
she was qualified for the positions.  We disagree.  Montgomery County’s decision to 
interview Satterwhite in spite of information that she was unqualified has no effect on the 
   
                                              
1 The Court notes that in April 2008, Satterwhite indicated a willingness to work on-call 
and was hired by Montgomery County as a part-time on-call secretary. 
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analysis.  Nothing about this fact undermines the requirements for the job; it is just as 
easily explained as a courtesy to a longtime employee.  Because Satterwhite fails to make 
a prima facie showing of discrimination, summary judgment was appropriately granted to 
Montgomery County. 
III.  
 Even if Satterwhite had made a prima facie showing, Montgomery County offers a 
non-discriminatory reason for not hiring her (her inability or unwillingness to 
accommodate the jobs’ work schedules), and Satterwhite fails to offer sufficient evidence 
of pretext.  Satterwhite points to the fact that she was the only African-American full-
time judicial secretary as circumstantial evidence of racism.   But as Montgomery County 
notes, it does not make hiring decisions for full-time judicial secretaries, so the racial 
composition of that group is inapposite.  There is no indication in the record that 
Montgomery County’s hiring decisions have been motivated by race.     
 Satterwhite also suggests that letters sent by Montgomery County to notify her that 
she was not selected for the positions are evidence of pretext.  Since the letters did not 
specify a reason for not hiring her, she argues that the presently stated reasons were 
manufactured to cover up Montgomery County’s discrimination.  We disagree.  The 
letters did not tell Satterwhite why she was not hired, but no reasonable jury could 
conclude from this that the reasons now offered by Montgomery County are pretexual. 
IV.  
 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the District Courts grant of summary 
judgment for Montgomery County. 
